Self-knowledge and Moral Agency by Ohba, Takeshi
Osaka University
Title Self-knowledge and Moral Agency
Author(s)Ohba, Takeshi
CitationPhilosophia Osaka. 5 P.1-P.21
Issue Date2010-03
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/10217
DOI
Rights
Philosophia OSAKA No.5, 200
Takeshi OHBA (Senshu University)
Self-knowledge and Moral Agency
We usually take it for granted that one knows one’s own mind better than anyone else. In 
fact, we do mutually acknowledge the so-called first person authority of one’s avowal of her 
belief. At the same time, we also realize that knowing ourselves is not so easy as to treat an 
old proverb “Know Thyself” as already expired. In this essay, I would like to examine recent 
debates about first person authority and attempt to boil down what seems essential from an 
ethical point of view. 
1.
When, looking up at the sky, it occurs to me that it is raining over there, this thought is 
usually accompanied by a seemingly second-order thought that I believe that it is raining 
over there. The latter thought is empirical, since it concerns a state of affairs, that is, my 
occurrent mental state. This thought seems further to be epistemicaly immediate in the sense 
that it is attained without any additional epistemic effort further than those which were 
exercised in gaining the belief about weather. 
Thus, in general, when thought that p occurs to a person, it seems that she is, by virtue of 
it alone, already in a position to avow in the first person “I believe that p”. Hearing a sincere 
avowal of this form, we audiences take it normally for true about the avower’s occurrent 
mental state. Of course, we can and do sometimes doubt whether “p” is true, because her 
belief is about the world which we also face with. By contrast, in order to doubt whether she 
really believes so, we need to gather extra evidence which legitimately suggests something 
unusual in her psychology, say, a possibility of self-deception or the like. To this extent at 
least, a sincere avowal enjoys the so-called first person authority, a specific security against 
being exposed to doubt. 
These all, I think, belong to platitudes about our daily communication, which even a 
tough behaviorist like Gilbert Ryle would admit. Then, is it not natural to say that a sincere 
avowal expresses the avower’s knowledge of her own mind, her self-knowledge? For, a 
 The reason I add the adverbial “seemingly” is that the notion of ‘second order’ thought usually 
induces one to take it for granted that it is a distinct thought from the first-order one, which seems 
in turn justify the locution of “being accompanied”. It is, however, this induction that I would like 
examine in this essay.
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sincere avowal is normally taken for a true report about an occurrent state of the avower. 
It is to this question, however, that many philosophers are now inclined to give a negative 
answer2. 
Of course, they do not deny the platitudes mentioned above. However, they deny that 
an avowal expresses a substantial knowledge of the avower’s mental state. Instead, Crispin 
Wright, for instance, claims that the acknowledgement of first person authority is a constituent 
of a social framework of communications, which needs no epistemological or semantical 
investigation in order to explain and justify it. In other words, the acknowledgement is a 
socio-practical device for making communications smooth by acknowledging one’s status 
as a competent communication partner. Here sounds clearly an echo of what Rorty called 
“epistemological behaviorism” which aims at “explaining … epistemic authority by reference 
to what society let us say”.
However, nobody would dare to deny that, pragmatically speaking, the acknowledgement 
of first person authority performs such a socio-practical function. What is arguable is, 
however, a kind of Eutypron question: whether the first person authority of an avowal is 
acknowledged because it is practically important, or its acknowledgement is practically 
important because an avowal has indeed an essentially first person authority by nature. Where 
does then their negative claim that an avowal is not really a report, which is a manifestation 
of one’s self-knowledge, stem from? It seems to stem from a consideration of an essential 
feature of an avowal. 
An avowal is fundamentally distinct from other kinds of descriptive utterance. An 
avowal of one’s own thought can enjoy an epistemically immediate authority in the sense 
mentioned at the beginning. This feature of an avowal does appear to collide with a general 
condition of a substantial knowledge, just as Paul Boghossian, for instance, made clear (989, 
5, 9.) For, in order for a belief to be a substantial knowledge about a state of affairs, it must 
be based upon an observation or upon inferences from observational evidence. If a belief 
which is based in neither way could be knowledge, it would be at best a formal or a priori 
knowledge. What is expressed, however, in an avowal cannot be a formal or a priori thought. 
So far, the suspicion about self-knowledge seems to be well supported by a general condition 
of knowledge. 
2 See Wright 986, Wright 989, Boghossian 989, and so on.
 “The authority … is, as it were, a concession, unofficially granted to anyone whom one takes 
seriously as a rational subject” (Wright 1986, 401.) 
 Rorty 1979, 174. He may be perhaps right in that he pursued to de-construct the obsession of giving 
an ultimate foundation epistemologically. But it does not necessarily follow that his diagnosis of first 
person authority is also correct.
Self-knowledge and Moral Agency 
2.
One might well here attempt to ascertain that a thought about one’s own mind is 
based upon a kind of observation, ‘introspection’ conceived as a sort of ‘inner’ perception. 
According to this sort of explanation, one introspects, that is, innerly perceives that a thought 
that p occurs, and then she reports that the thought that p occurs to her. Since it is the subject 
alone who can innerly perceive her own mental state directly, an avowal should enjoy the 
first person authority. 
When one assimilates ‘introspection’ to perception this way, she has already adopted, so 
to speak, a two-layered model of a cognitive activity: a model according to which there is an 
item given independently of one’s spontaneous activity on the one hand, and her capacity is 
exercised actively so as to recognize the item on the other hand. Let me call this a model of 
“independently given & actively achieved.”
Following this model, a difference between perception and introspection would be 
explained as follows. In perception, the first layer, i.e. the ‘independently given’ is given 
externally, or from without, while in introspection it is given innerly within a mind. 
Accordingly, the “actively achieved” on the second layer is yielded by different cognitive 
capacities; in perception it is achieved by perceptual capacity, while in introspection it is 
done by an introspective one. 
The model will be intuitively harmless about perception, insofar as the ‘independently 
given’ is taken to be a perceived object itself. It exists prior to, and independently of, our 
exercise of perceptual capacity, and we come to recognize it through our perceptual capacity. 
Thus, a relation between the perceived object and perception is contingent in the sense that it 
is always possible for an object to remain unperceived. The relation is therefore mediated by 
exercises of cognitive capacities.   
A relation between one’s own thought and an avowal, however, does not seem to be 
contingent and mediated that way. When a thought occurs, it is usually accompanied by 
a seemingly higher order thought which is expressed in avowal. If the latter thought is a 
cognitive gain by virtue of ‘introspection’ conceived as an inner perception, it would be 
always possible for the former thought to remain unnoticed by the thinker herself. This 
would, however, be implausible, just as Sydney Shoemaker emphasized it in his ingenious 
arguments5.
Of course, we sometimes ascribe to a person a so-called ‘unconscious’ thought, which 
remains unnoticed by its very thinker unless the thinker comes to ‘discover’ it in some 
manner. But, to introduce the notion of unconscious thought here would doubly jumble up 
5 Shoemaker 988, 99.
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the matter rather than settling. First, when, looking up at sky, a thought about weather occurs 
to me and a seemingly higher order thought accompanies it, both sorts of thought are not held 
unconsciously. Second, if a thought is entertained unconsciously, it could not be ‘discovered’ 
simply by introspection, since it is essential for a thought to be unconscious that it escapes 
any introspective screening. It is not by ‘inner’ perception but through complex inference, 
mobilizing memories, others’ remarks about ourselves and so on, that we come to identify 
our own unconscious thought.
The relation between a thought and awareness of it, which I provisionally characterized 
above in terms of “being accompanied”, is fundamentally different in kind from a relation 
between an object and the perception of it. A thought that p and awareness of it are connected 
so immediately that I do not need, in order to become aware of the thought, to achieve 
any further epistemic effort than that I achieved in ascertaining that p. It is precisely this 
immediacy that makes the model of “independently given and actively achieved” unsuitable 
to ‘introspection’. 
So far, the skeptics about introspective self-knowledge may well appear to be right when 
they characterize it banteringly as “an analogy of kaleidoscope” (Wright) or “a Cartesian 
theater” (Dennett)6. To be sure, this may be not sufficient for rejecting the model as a whole. 
There might be room, which I cannot yet find so far, for explaining the second layer, the 
“actively achieved”, as a product of a cognitive capacity other than a sort of perceptual 
capacity. Christopher Peacock, for instance, once offered an argument for such a prospect, 
according to which an avowal expresses a higher order judgment based upon having an 
experience about a state of affairs. The judgment is, so to speak, so familiar that there 
emerges a short-cut circuit which gives us an impression of immediacy. Although I do not 
deny that this could be the case, it sounds to me a little artificial and not fully convincing as 
an explanation of the immediacy in question8.
If my observation is not totally off the point, there does not seem to be a hopeful prospect 
about the cognitive explanation of the first person authority based upon the two-layered 
model: a model of “independently given & actively achieved by a cognitive capacity.” This 
also seems to explain partly why many philosophers are recently attempting to offer a non-
cognitive explanation.
6 Wright 1998, 22, Dennet 1991, 17, 113, 137.
 Peacocke 1999, ch. 5 - 6. However, Peacocke 1998 seems to pursue a little different line of thinking 
which could be taken for more Kantian.
8 Regarding these issues, see, for instance, Gallois 996.
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3.
Very roughly speaking, there are two types of non-cognitive explanation of first person 
authority: one which appeals to a notion of expression and another which appeals to that of 
commitment or endorsement9. Do they, then, succeed in explaining that a sincere avowal is a 
report which can be a manifestation of the avower’s self-knowledge?
Let us first consider an expressivist explanation. No doubt, to avow is a conative act of 
expressing one’s mind by virtue of issuing a sentence which has a truth-condition. But an 
avowal is different in kind from a natural expression like an infant’s crying. When a young 
infant cries because she misses her mother, her crying expresses her mental state. A careful 
observer will ascribe to her a belief that her mother is absent. Surely, her crying serves, on 
the part of hearers, as a report of her mental state. But it is by virtue of an interpretative 
activity by the hearer that her crying serves as a report. In contrast, a sincere avowal is a 
report, beyond merely functioning as a report on the part of an audience. 
 Generally speaking, when an informational system s exhibits some behavior, an 
observer ascribes to it a thought, say a belief that p, and makes a description that s believes 
that p. However, this does not in itself imply that s is itself in a position to issue an avowal in 
the first person. What is, then, further needed to be in a position to avow, when s expresses its 
mental or informational state? 
Is it sufficient for being in a position to avow, if s exhibits a verbal behavior of avowing? 
This question may sound absurd, but I don’t think so. Suppose that an alien from a far distant 
galaxy has eventually managed to master our language. He now uses also the construction 
‘I believe that … .’ But imagine further that it turns out that he uses it merely as a kind of 
adverbial device for making assertions. This is similar to the famous thought-experiment by 
Sydney Shoemaker about ‘self-blind’0, which I cannot unfortunately deal with here.
Returning to the above situation, the alien can now join in the sort of conversation in 
which someone asks him whether he does indeed believe that p. However, even when he is 
participating in it, the notion of “one’s own occurrent mental state” remains to him nothing 
but a phrase void of substantially descriptive meaning, just as the phrase “by the mercy of 
Czar” among the old Russian peasants was to a civilized foreigner. So, when asked whether 
he indeed believes that p, he can reply simply by considering whether there is a further 
evidence in the world which may be a good reason to withdraw his assertion. If there are 
none, he replies “Yes, I believe that p.”
Now, is his reply also a report made by him of his occurrent mental state? If an answer is 
9 As a typical instance of the former, see Bar-On 2004, and of the latter, Moran1994, 2001, Bilgrami 
998.
0 Shoemaker 988, 99. 
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determined to be affirmative, what about an alarm device which issues a warning by making 
an artificial voice which sounds “I believe that such and such goes out of order!”? This may 
sound a little silly or exaggerated. I don’t think, however, that the question about the alien’s 
avowal is easy to answer simply with recourse to a behavioral criterion. To this extent, at 
least, it can make sense to ask what it is to be in a position to avow, and how it assures that a 
genuine avowal is also a report of the avower’s occurrent mental state.
Why does it, then, make sense to deny that the crying infant or the seemingly avowing 
alien really issues an avowal? An answer would be that each of their behaviors of expressing 
does not seem to be an intentional actions of expressing their minds, an action the intention 
of which is to express their mind. If an avowal is an intentional action of expressing one’s 
mind, an avower needs to intend to express, which in turn seems to require that she herself 
understands the content she intends to express. This point seems to me crucial. Since an 
avowal is an intentional act of expressing one’s mind by issuing a truth-apt sentence, an 
avower must be able to discern whether the sentence she is going to use is suitable for 
expressing her mind. In order for discern this, she must know her occurrent mental state.
There can be a sense, then, in which the expressivist explanations of first person authority 
leave some aspect unexplained, since they say nothing explicitly about how an avower, 
unlike a crying infant, comes to understand what she intends to express, if it were not for a 
cognitive effort whether perceptual, judgemental, or else. It seems to be similar about another 
type of non-cognitive explanation.
4. 
Consider now another non-cognitive explanation of the first person authority, which 
Richard Moran recently has offered. According to it, when I avow that I believe that p, I 
am performing more than expressing my mind. In avowing so, I actively identify the belief 
as mine, and I endorse it by committing myself to the truth of the proposition that p2. In 
short, what constitutes first person authority is “the authority of the person to make up his 
mind, change his mind, endorse some attitudes or disavow it” (92.) This view differs from 
the expressivist explanations in that the act of endorsing by making a commitment is an 
essentially normative one, which only the avower can achieve in first person as a decision 
about what to believe, and which she takes the responsibility of. Thus, a source of first person 
authority, that is, what an particular person alone can perform in first person, is shifted more 
clearly from an epistemic space to that of practical and normative domain. In this sense, we 
 Moran 99, 200. 
2 Moran 2001, especially 83-94, 113-120, 131-34.
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may well characterize his approach as a pioneering attempt of what Bilgrami calls “normative 
turn”.
This sheds a fresh light upon the first person authority. The reason why we normally take 
a sincere avowal to be true about one’s own occurrent mental state is, according to this view, 
that an avowal is a practical achievement of settling the matter about what to believe, which 
no one else could do on behalf of the avower. If an avowal is a mere description of one’s 
occurrent mental state, there might well, in principle, be someone else who could quasi-
omnisciently describe it better. However, it is only I that can make up my mind as to what I 
should believe. 
Further, this view explains nicely why the so-called “Moore-paradoxical” statement 
sounds paradoxical; a statement of the form “non-p, but I believe that p.” A sentence of 
this form does not commit a syntactical or semantical contradiction. It commits, however, 
according to the view, a pragmatic inconsistency, because an avowal of the belief that p 
requires one to commit herself to truth of p.
Thus, the explanation of the first person authority with recourse to the notion of 
commitment runs smoother and convincingly, so far. But, wherein does it differ from the 
above mentioned socio-practical explanation? According to it, to admit first person authority 
is nothing more than qualifying a person as a rational agent who can decide what to believe. 
A difference would be that the explanation with recourse to the notion of commitment 
admits an avowal to be a report made by the avower of her occurrent mental state, which is 
a manifestation of self-knowledge, while the socio-practical view does not admit it. In fact, 
Moran himself repeatedly emphasizes this.
How, then, can an avowal of one’s own belief enjoy a status of a true report which is a 
manifestation of one’s self-knowledge, if it were not backed up by any epistemic achievement 
at all? This question consists of, at least, two component questions. First, how can an avowal 
of a belief be so secure, as if it needs no extra epistemic effort? Second, does the explanation 
of first person authority in terms of commitment to truth fit as well to an avowal of other 
kinds of mental state, say, a desire or a hope? Is it likely that we do endorse some proposition 
which is true about the world when we avow our own desire or hope? In the following, I 
would like to mainly deal with the first question, because it concerns a more basic issue and a 
 Bilgrami 998, 2. However, it seems a little unobvious wherein his stance is distinctively different 
from what Wright calls “the Default View” (1989, 41), since the conceptual relation between our 
normatively “reactive attitudes” such as resentiment or gratitude and the agent’s capability to explain 
her behavior can be more complicated than he seems to assume.
 Moran 2001, 104. This constitutes the essential issue when he argues against what he calls “the 
Presentational View”, according to which “the verb-phrase ‘I believe’ … is a mode of presenting the 
relevant proposition” (71. 101.) 
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consideration upon it may, I hope, give some clue to the second question.
5. 
The first questions might sound too silly. For, either sort of non-cognitive explanations, 
that is, explanation in terms of expressing and in terms of endorsement, seems to presuppose 
that one comes to notice immediately what is going on in her mind when she is thinking 
consciously. To be sure, this presupposition sounds intuitively natural. As argued earlier, 
when an infant begins to cry because of missing her mother, we ascribe a belief to her. Even 
then, however, we don’t describe her believing it by saying “the infant knows that she herself 
believes that her mother is out of sight”. If we are asked why, we would reply that she is not 
yet thinking consciously; not sufficiently conscious to entertain a self-conscious thought. 
This reply sounds plausible to us. It is, however, upon this plausibility that a skeptic of 
the first person authority casts a doubt. He is suspecting that what one’s conscious thinking 
enables her to immediately attain is too insubstantial to be counted as knowledge of her 
occurrent mental state. If a non-cognitivist merely presupposes and rehearses the reply 
without offering an articulated explanation, she might leave an aspect of the first person 
authority unexplained, the aspect which the skeptics bring into focus.
So, we now find ourselves dragged into a fairly perplexing situation, even a dilemma. If 
we suppose, following the cognitive explanation, that we come to notice the occurrent mental 
state by virtue of introspection conceived as inner perception, our explanation collides with 
the essential feature of avowal, that is, its epistemic immediacy. If we adopt, however, the 
non-cognitive strategy instead and merely presuppose that a conscious thinking enables us to 
immediately know what is going on in our mind, then our explanation would remain silent 
toward the skeptics.
In this situation, what attracts my attention is this: the non-cognitive explanation also 
shares with cognitivist the two-layered model of ‘independently given and actively achieved’, 
since it presupposes that a conscious thinking enables us to notice immediately our own 
mental state independently of our practical achievement of expressing or endorsing. In fact, 
according to Moran, “without endorsement the person cannot declare his belief through 
avowal of it. He might still, however, retain a kind of immediate epistemic access to it” (92.)5 
Based upon the two-layered model, both cognitivist and non-cognitivist attempt to moor 
5 When Moran says “for any person who is self-consciously reflecting on his state of mind, there will 
be some answer to the question of what stance he takes toward what he discovers there” (147, emphasis 
added), Moran seems to think it possible, based on the presupposition, that a self-conscious thinker 
‘discovers’ his own thought apart from his practical stance to it.
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first person authority onto some rock of the second layer of ‘actively achieved’, onto some 
active achievement which an avower alone can perform and nobody else could do on her 
behalf. According to the cognitivist, a thought is simply ‘given independently’ and the thinker 
comes to notice it by virtue of ‘active achievement’ performed by introspective capacity. 
In the non-cognitive explanation, in contrast, what is ‘actively achieved’ is a conative or 
practical performance of expressing or of endorsing. What is ‘given’ is a thought, which 
the thinker comes aware of independently of a particular conative or practical achievement 
if only one is thinking consciously. In short, cognitivists see the ‘active achievement’ in 
avower’s cognitive activity of introspection, while non-cognitivists see it in her conative or 
practical activity. Thus, a way of using the model is different. But, they share the model itself 
in common. 
Now, it seems to me that what makes our situation perplexing stems from staying within 
this model. If we continue attempting to explain first person authority within this model, 
we would either take a cognition of one’s mental state to be an achievement of our active 
introspection, or send it back to the layer of ‘independently given’ by simply presupposing 
that conscious thinking enables us to immediately know one’s own mind. How, then, does 
conscious thinking enable us to notice knowledgeably our occurrent mental event, while a 
thinking which proceeds in a crying infant does not? 
6. 
I have so far repeatedly said that an occurrence of a thought that p is usually ‘accompanied 
by a seemingly higher order thought that I believe that p’. Now, this usage of ‘higher order 
thought’ has some affinity with the two-layered model. It induces us, not to say “implies”, 
to suppose that, when we are consciously thinking, there are two distinct thought-episodes, 
i.e. two distinct mental event of coming to entertain a thought; when one is consciously 
thinking, she comes to hold a belief about the world, on the one hand, and in addition to it, or 
over this layer, she also comes to notice the very thought-episode and to hold a higher order 
thought about the thought, on the other hand. Thus, while a crying infant entertains merely 
a first order thought, a conscious thinker holds also a corresponding higher order thought, 
in addition to the former. The popular terminology of a ‘higher order’ thought, which is 
sometimes said to be “locked on to” a first order thought6, seems to me to show that we are 
inclined to think this way. 
If we are seduced to draw such a picture, we are dragged into the perplexing situation. 
6 Burge 1988, 660. The term “locked on to” is used by Burge to point to self-referentiality, and now by 
Bar-On 2004 (162, 167) to summarize many attempt to block skepticism about self-knowledge.
0 Takeshi OHBA
For, nothing is yet said articulately about how the alleged ‘higher order’ thought-episode 
could be so secure as to yield knowledge. If this observation is not totally off the point, a 
way out seems to be hard to find unless we reject the two-layered model all together. We 
should now cease to think that there are two distinct thought-episodes; a thinking about the 
world, and another one about mental state. We should instead think that there be only a single 
thought-episode when we think consciously as Burge earlier suggested it (1988, 654). Thus, 
we are to attempt to explain how a conscious thinking makes it possible that one and the 
same thought-episode can concern simultaneously the world and the very mental state. A 
possible key to this question seems to me to lie in Kant’s criticism of the Cartesian reification 
of the cogito. 
When Kant criticized Cartesian hypostatization of the cogito and argued that the cogito 
in itself is nothing but a “form of thinking” (A354) or “a form of representation in general” 
(B 404), his insight seems to be important to our problems. An essential core of his insight 
seems to me to crystallize in his assertion that “nothing can be thought and known, unless 
given representations share the act of apperception ‘I think’ and thereby combined in one and 
the same self-consciousness” (B. 137, emphasis added8.) This assertion could be understood 
as follows. 
Suppose that a thought p occurs and at the same time the opposite thought not-p also 
does. This does not yet constitute a logical contradiction unless both thoughts are entertained 
by one and the same thinker. Otherwise it means that two competing thoughts occurred 
somewhere in the world respectively, which is not in itself a contradiction. The thoughts gain 
a status of thought to be normatively assessed precisely when they are subsumed and related 
to each other by the operation of the cogito or ‘I think’ and embedded within a single scope 
of ‘I think that …’. Thus, synchronically speaking, a thought can have a determined content 
and value only by virtue of becoming a knot in an inferentially connected web of a thinker’s 
belief system, that is, only by virtue of the ‘synthesizing’ operation of the ‘I think’. 
Diachronically speaking, the matter is basically the same. Suppose that, first, the top 
of a high tower appears in sight, next its trunk, and eventually its base appears. This series 
of visual experiences do not yet constitute a perceptual thought of one and the same tower, 
unless they “share the act of apperception ‘I think’ and thereby combined in one and the same 
 Burge claimed earlier that “[w]hen one knows that one is thinking that p, one is not taking one’s 
thought that p as an object. … It is thought and thought about in the same mental event” (1988, 654, 
emphasis added.) His claim may well be taken for proposing the same as mine rather than suggesting 
the relation of  ‘locking on’ between two thoughts.
8 We perhaps should make an amendment to his phrase “nothing can be thought and known” by adding 
to the word “be thought” an adverbial phrase, for instance, “in the way which enables us to avow it”, 
otherwise it would be difficult to allow for room for a notion of unconscious thought.
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self-consciousness”.
Thus, Kant says that the operation ‘I think’ is “an act of spontaneity … which 
accompanies to any representation” (B 132), but “a mere consciousness of I … is nothing 
but … a form of representation in general” (B 404). This insight which I tentatively call the 
‘Kantian insight’ seems to me highly significant to our issues, exactly because it seems to 
shed new light upon a possible way out from the two-layered model.
7.
An idea which the Kantian insight suggests is this: an operation of the ‘I think’ 
performs two things simultaneously. It organizes or composites, or to speak with Kant’ own 
term ‘synthesizes’, a meaningful thought, on the one hand, and simultaneously, in doing 
so, announces authorship of the thought, on the other hand. The term ‘announcement of 
authorship’ may sound exaggerated, but not necessarily. Suppose that, when I say something, 
an audience fails to identify its utterer and asks “Who said that?” Then I will reply saying, 
“It is I who said that.” Such announcement of authorship is an essential condition for being a 
responsible thinker, an agent being able to respond to a question about who. 
To be sure, thinking cannot be reduced to a linguistic activity. But, human thinking is 
already structured linguistically to that extent. To think as a human being involves using 
words latently toward possible audiences even when we think secretly in the dark, and it 
therefore requires a certain sort of preparedness to respond to a possible question “Who did 
think that?” or “Who are you to dare to think that?” 
Thus, the operation of the ‘I think’ is simultaneously cognitive and conative, exactly 
because its scope is, so to speak, forked. Its operation is cognitive in that it composites or 
‘synthesizes’ an articulated thought, and it is at the same time conative or practical in that 
it announces authorship and makes a commitment to it as one’s own thought. Thinking this 
way, we could say that a conscious mode of thinking is a mode in which the Kantian ‘I think’ 
actively operates so that it can yield a single thought which is at the same time about the 
world and about one’s very mental state. Then, there seems to be the possible prospect that 
we could explain the immediacy of an avowal and its first person authority.
The Kantian insight gives a prospect that a conscious thinking can have, simply by 
virtue of being conscious, a so to speak double aspect: it is simultaneously a thinking about 
an object and about the thinker herself. This is due to the dual-scoped operation of the 
‘I think’. Following this prospect, an assertion that p and an avowal that I believe that p 
can be understood as two distinct expressions of one and the same conscious thought, 
respectively. We do no longer need to remain loyal to the two-layered model, supposing that 
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there are two distinct thought episodes, a first order thought and a higher order achievement.
Of course, a sentence “p” and a sentence “I believe that p” are distinct. But, we do not 
now, simply on that account, need to think that there are two distinct thoughts which are to 
be expressed by a distinct sentence respectively. Rather, in so far as they express a conscious 
thought, the two sentences are used to express the content of one and the same thought, 
though, with different foci: one focused upon the world, and the other upon the thinker. This 
is the reason why an avowal is immediate; why we need no additional epistemic efforts to 
avow. And an avowal can enjoy first person authority, because it is an explicit expression of 
the operation by the ‘I think’ of announcing authorship of the thought.
Notice; this explanation allows the possibility that my assertion that p turns out to be 
false, while my avowal that I believe that p remains true. Indeed, what occurs is one and 
the same thought-episode. But, its content can be expressed with different foci; with a focus 
upon the world and with another upon thinker herself. According to the difference of focus, 
different sentences can be used for expressing the thought. Since the two different sentences 
have distinct truth conditions, it is possible that my assertion turns out false while my avowal 
of my own belief remains true.
The point is that there is only a single thought-episode. It is not the case that there is a 
first order thought about the world on the one hand, and a higher order thought about the 
thought one the other. Therefore there can be no room for it that the former can qualify as 
knowledge while the latter cannot.
8.
This explanation following the Kantian insight, however, leads to a bothersome question 
about the status of an avowal of one’s belief in contrast to other sorts of mental state. 
Following the insight, any thought of mine is constructed and articulated under the operation 
of the ‘I think’ regardless of its contents, whether the thought may concern the outer world, 
other minds, or my own mind. Consider the following thoughts which occur to me now:
() It is going to rain.
(2) She is afraid that he will get wet.
() It is desirable that her family will do well, or
(’) I desire that her family will do well. 
(4) He has probably gone out with an umbrella, or
(’) I believe that he went out with umbrella.
When I avow each of these thoughts, I usually utter straightly the above sentences 
respectively, without using the construction ‘I believe that’ and embedding each of them 
Self-knowledge and Moral Agency 
into it, that is, without uttering a sentence which is usually used for expressing a higher 
order thought. Nonetheless, when I avow, an utterance of each of the above sentences can be 
thought of to be anteceded by a construction ‘I believe that’, insofar as this construction can 
be taken for a manifestation of the ‘I think’. Now, according to the Kantian insight, none of 
the resulting complex sentences which equally anteceded by “I believe that” is to be seen as 
an expression of a higher-order thought which is distinct from the first-order one. Should we, 
then, think that all of these are used for avowing a belief or should we think otherwise? 
If we choose the former, then we would have to give a highly special status to an 
avowal of belief in contrast to other sorts of mental state. We would think the following. An 
avowal of one’s belief can enjoy first person authority in a special way, insofar as the leading 
construction “I believe that” can be taken for a manifestation of the operation of the Kantian 
‘I think’. This is not the case, however, at least in the same manner, with an avowal of one’s 
desire, hope or the like. When I avow that I desire that p, it is hard to regard the construction 
“I desire that” as a manifestation of the ‘I think’ in the same manner as we can regard the 
“I believe that” so. What can enjoy first person authority in the special manner is rather 
a more complex utterance of the form “I believe that I desire that p”, “I believe that I am 
delighted”. This is because it is only the precedent phrase “I believe” which can be taken for 
a manifestation the operation of the ‘I think’, while the embedded phrase “I desire” cannot be 
in the same manner. 
This might seem, perhaps, an inevitable consequence of the Kantian insight. If so, there 
would be a striking asymmetry between an avowal of belief and that of other mental states 
concerning its first person authority9. I am not yet fully sure that this line of thinking could 
provide us with a wholly convincing explanation of our linguistic praxis. There seems, 
however, to be something in our praxis which could leave room for such asymmetry. In our 
daily communications, an avowal of a desire or the like seems to be much more vulnerable 
to a doubt than that of a belief. A doubtful question regarding a desire, for instance, “Do you 
really desire that p?”, “What you really desire is rather that q, isn’t it?” is often much easier 
to raise than against an avowal of a belief. No doubt, even a sincere avowal of one’s own 
belief cannot be infallible. We are sometimes victims of self-deception regarding our own 
beliefs. However, an avowal of the form “I believe that I desire that p” is much more secure 
than the more direct “I desire that p.”
If this is the case, the old proverb ‘Know thyself’ would remain still important especially 
concerning mental states other than belief. For, my avowal that I desire that p cannot enjoy 
9 This may be, perhaps, underwritten by our experience of self-deception, which seems to show that 
we are apt to be fallen into self-deception concerning our own emotion or practical attitude more often 
than concerning a brute fact in the world.
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first person authority in the same manner, and to the same degree, as my avowal that I believe 
that I desire that p can. If  I am confronted with the question “Do you really desire it?”, I 
must ponder not only the desirability of p, but also upon myself, including my behaviors, my 
memories, remarks made about me by others, and so on. 
To be sure, this line of thinking seems to incline toward an excessive type of 
intellectualism, if it leaves no room for first person authority of an avowal of a desire or the 
like. We do each other admit and respect the authority. But, it does not seem fully convincing 
to suppose that an avowal of a desire can enjoy first person authority as well, on the ground 
that an avower commits herself to truth of a proposition that the desired thing is really 
desirable20. 
We should rather think of first person authority of an avowal of a desire or the like in 
more ‘voluntaristic’ way in Moran’s sense2. We might then be able to explain first person 
authority of an avowal of a deontic or conative sort of mental states like desire or intention in 
terms of an explicitly volitional verb like ‘will’, ‘decide’ or the like, which could be regarded 
as a conative counterpart of the Kantian ‘I think’ 22. This needs, however, a totally different 
analysis which goes beyond problematic of self-knowledge which I am dealing with here.
Anyway, following these lines, although there is a difference in kind between an avowal 
of belief and that of other mental states, this difference does not necessarily make the latter 
less secure. Then, we are now able to answer the second question mentioned at the end of 
section 4 negatively. Even though we may explain fairly well first person authority of one’s 
belief in terms of commitment to truth of a proposition about the world, this explanation does 
not fit to an avowal of a desire, emotion, hope, or the like.
9. 
Thus, following the Kantian insight this way, we must now divide avowals into two 
subclasses in respect of its security. One is an avowal of one’s own belief which can be seen 
as a manifestation of the Kantian ‘I think’, and another is that of other mental states, for 
instance, a desire, an emotion, or the like. When I avow my desire or emotion, my avowal 
usually enjoys, so to speak, prima facie first person authority. These avowals are, however, 
more vulnerable to cross-examinations than that of a belief, just as is seen in the previous 
section. By contrast, an avowal of a belief can enjoy first person authority simpliciter. When 
20 Moran seems to be inclined to think of desire this way (6-8).
2 Moran 1988 gives such an explanation about authority of an avowal of intention.
22 Rather, we had better, perhaps, posit a more basic operation of ‘I decide’ which involves cognitive ‘I 
think’ as well as conative ‘I will’ at the same time. Then, an explanation of first person authority would, 
perhaps, inherit some idea similar to what Moran calls “constitutive” view (Moran, 2001, 38.)
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a thought that a professor is admirable occurs to me, my avowal “I believe that I admire the 
professor” is true, even though it may turn out that I really rather look down upon him. This 
is simply because the precedent phrase “I believe” can be seen as a manifestation of the 
Kantian ‘I think’ which enables us to entertain an articulated and meaningful thought at all, 
regardless whether its content concerns either the world or one’s own mind. 
An avowal of belief has, thus, a special epistemic security not because it is an expression 
of a seemingly higher order thought which is supposedly attained by virtue of an extra 
epistemic effort of the thinker herself, but because it can be seen as manifestation of the 
fact that the first order thought itself is articulated under “the act of apperception ‘I think’ 
and thereby combined in one and the same self-consciousness.” An avowal of any occurent 
belief, so-to-speak, automatically enjoys the epistemic security and therefore the first person 
authority, at least insofar as one is thinking consciously.   
Then, it might seem, to speak with Boghossian’s phrase, that an avowal of an occurent 
belief is ‘insubstantial’ in the sense that an indexical judgement that ‘I am here now’ is 
insubstantial because it is always true by virtue of grammar of indexicals, even when we 
reject to join in his externalism. Does this, however, imply that what is expressed in an 
avowal of belief is too ‘insubstantial’ to constitute knowledge about oneself?
Is it, to begin with, true that the indexical sentence “I am now here” is doomed to be too 
insubstantial to be an expression of one’s self-knowledge?  It appears to be so, at first glance, 
because it tells nothing about a particular time and place where he is then. Suppose, however, 
it is uttered just after his being involved in a serious disaster. Hearing it, we, the audience, 
then understand that he knows that he himself is still alive. Suppose that, further, he continues 
to utter, in reply to our question about where he is, that “I don’t know, but there is a huge 
bridge in front of me, and a tall tower over there.” We then guess the place where he is and, 
in doing so, we take it for granted that he knows what sort of place he himself is located at, 
even though he cannot at that time specify the place in terms of proper name yet. Thus, the 
indexical utterance can be taken to express the utterer’s self-knowledge, at least insofar as he 
has already acquired capacity to correlate his description of the landscape with a particular 
point on a map2. 
Now it seems to me that the circumstance is the same concerning an avowal of a belief. 
The fact that it is true, “based on nothing” (Boghossian), only by virtue of its ‘grammar’ 
does not necessarily imply that it is too insubstantial to be taken as an expression of one’s 
self-knowledge, at least insofar as the avower has already mastered capacity to correlate the 
content of belief, or concepts which compose it, with a description of the objective world. 
2 About such superposition of an objectively locating description onto a subjective description of a 
landscape, see Lewis 1979 and Evans 1982.
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10.
 If we still deny that an avowal of a belief is an expression of self-knowledge on account 
of its being ‘insubstantial’, then we are to think that the avower does not need to know that 
she herself entertains the belief despite the fact that she consciously believes it. Could we still 
then acknowledge that she knows about the world which her belief is about? 
To begin with, avowing one’s belief is a linguistic performance of announcing 
authorship, which cannot be achieved without being conscious of one’s entertaining the 
belief. And, following the Kantian insight, both my consciously believing that p and being 
conscious that it is I who believes that p are two aspects of one and the same thinking. 
Then it seems extremely hard to suppose that a conscious belief about the world can be a 
candidate of knowledge while self-consciousness cannot. This diagnosis seems to be able to 
be supported by our practice of ascription of knowledge.
Suppose that an infant watches her surroundings and behaves herself in a certain way. 
Then, we legitimately ascribe to her a certain belief about the surroundings. Suppose further 
that it turns out to be true. Now, her belief is based upon her own observing her surroundings 
and is in fact true. Even then, we would not regard her belief as knowledge, unless we can 
say that the infant is aware that she herself observes it2. This seems to me to offer a reason 
for accounting consciousness of one’s own belief as a sort of knowledge.
Knowing is essentially an active, first person business of a reflective and responsible 
agent who can account for reasons why she thinks so. To have knowledge is not merely a 
putative informational state which an observer ascribes to others on the basis of observation 
of their behaviors. To ascribe knowledge to someone involves regarding her as being 
conscious of what she herself believes25. Then, we had rather think that what an avowal 
expresses constitutes, so to speak, ‘transcendentally’ basic knowledge, in the sense that it 
alone makes possible knowledge in general. Citing again the core phrase of the Kantian 
insight, “nothing can be thought and known, unless given representations share the act of 
apperception ‘I think’ and thereby combined in one and the same self-consciousness.” If these 
considerations are not totally off the point, we can answer the Euthypron question mentioned 
in the beginning: the first person authority of an avowal is acknowledged not simply because 
it is practically important; rather, acknowledging first person authority is important to society 
exactly because an avowal expresses the transcendentally basic knowledge about oneself.
2 Despite ‘the Gettier problem’ I think that the notion of “true, justifiable belief” can serve as a 
common sense criterion of knowledge. Then, to be aware of content of one’s own belief can be counted 
as a constituent of justifiability without committing ourselves to a strict version of internalism about 
knowledge.
25 This appears, to be sure, to get into trouble concerning the so-called tacit knowledge, but it seems to 
me possible to separate it from occurrent consideration if we could take it a kind of practical capacity.
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11.
Now I have made much of the Kantian insight in searching a way out from our 
perplexing circumstances as regards first person authority. The core the insight lies in 
focusing on the active operation of the ‘I think’ which alone makes possible any articulated 
thought. Does not it, then, lead to restoration of the alleged absolute certainty of the Cartesian 
cogito to emphasize this way the constitutive importance of self-consciousness ? On the 
contrary, it is precisely for the purpose of criticizing the Cartesian hypostatization of cogito 
that Kant emphasized that, in cogito, “the I is a mere form of consciousness” (A328) and “a 
mere consciousness of I … is nothing but … a form of representation in general” (B404). 
These remarks are still now, not only an ontologically significant warning against 
hypostatizing the cogito, but also in moral philosophy highly important when we think about 
first person authority of an avowal. An avowal manifests the synthesizing and authorship-
announcing operation of the ‘I think’. In avowing, one manifests her competence as a 
responsible thinker, responsible to a question of “Who and What?” This crucial point of an 
avowal, however, can reinforce hypostatizing the ‘I think’ under the name of an ‘inner self’, 
‘true self’, or the like, despite Kant’s repeated warning. 
This is the more likely to happen when we remain, though implicitly, within the two-
layered model of ‘independently given and actively achieved’. For, the alleged inner self 
appears to be a suitable executive of the supposed higher-order achievement exercised onto 
the given. Once the ‘I think’ is regarded as an achievement by “inner self”, the notion of 
“inner self” in turn alludes us to take the two-layered model for ontologically guaranteed. 
If we are tempted this way, we become inclined to figure out as follows: first, various kinds 
of thought-episodes happen within us independently of our exercising practical or conative 
capacity. Next, our ‘inner selves’ censor them and actively pick out a thought to endorse and 
to express.  
What is problematic about this figure is that it is totally up to one’s ‘inner self’ to actively 
pick out a thought to endorse. To be sure, it is up to me to decide what to think and which 
thought to avow, in an ordinary sense of ‘up to’. This sense of ‘up to me’ is indispensable to 
a responsible agency, as Moran rightly emphasizes it. In the figure in question, however, one 
would be seduced to overdraw, with recourse to the notion of ‘up to’, a strong conclusion 
from the fact that our mental state is sometimes or even often indeterminate about what to 
believe. To be sure, our mental states are not always stable and fixed. According to Moran, 
“without endorsement the person cannot declare his belief through avowal of it. He might 
still, however, retain a kind of immediate epistemic access to it.” (2001, 92) What status 
should be, then, conferred on such a thought which “I retain a kind of immediate epistemic 
access to” without endorsing it? 
8 Takeshi OHBA
An answer will be this: such a thought merely constitutes content of such an unfixed 
mental states as ‘being wondering whether’, ‘being afraid that’, or the like. Another answer, 
however, could be drawn if the ‘I think’ was reified as an ‘inner self’. It would run as follows: 
the thought in question could not yet be qualified as my own belief, since I still suspend 
endorsing it. The thought, instead, remains a mere happening in my mind. Although it in fact 
occurred in my mind, it is a mere exudate within me, instead of being my own thought which 
I am the author of. Thus, it is my ‘inner self’ who does or does not identify a thought as my 
own. 
If the operation of ‘I think’ is hypostatized as an achievement of ‘inner self’, the notion 
of ‘up to me’ could then degenerate into a tool for rejecting identification of an uncomfortable 
thought within me as my own, and for spinning a story about myself which sounds sweet to 
my ears. Suppose that a thought occurs to me which embarrasses me by making me realize 
that I am the kind of person who does entertain such a thought. Then, not only can I decide 
not to avow it, but also I could even refuse to identify it as my own thought, following a 
mandate issued by my ‘inner self’. In this respect, the hypostatized ‘inner self’ resembles an 
absolute monarch who governs his territory and determines at will who are inhabitants and 
who are not. 
12.
An ‘inner self’ qua such an absolute monarch could exercise his sovereignty further 
outwards in order to reject ‘domestic interferences’. Suppose that someone, observing my 
behaviors, describes my thought in a certain way which jars on my ear, although I do not 
regard it as a mere framing up. Then, not only could I refuse to identify it as a description 
of my own thought by saying that “it is not a thought held by true and real me, although it 
might have appeared as if I think so in her eyes”, but also could I further attempt to justify 
my response by talking to myself that “others have no authority at all to determine what my 
true self is thinking” just as an absolute monarch rejects, under the name of ‘interference in 
the domestic affairs’, any advice from without which jars on his ears.
The notion of ‘up to me’ could thus degenerate into an emblem of the Guards of a 
monarch, if the operation of the ‘I think’ is hypothesized as discussed. This is morally 
serious, not only in the sense of leading to irresponsible and cheap self-justification, but also 
in that it undermines a basis of both human agency and mutual acknowledgement, just as, for 
instance, Hegel’s famous argument about ‘the dialectic of a master and a servant’ suggests it. 
In order for us to mutually acknowledge as responsible agents, each party must be prepared 
to superpose a description offered by others in third or second person onto one’s own first 
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person avowal. A superposition of the form “it is me that you describe so” is indispensable to 
mutual acknowledgement, no matter how I am unwilling to hear a harsh description by you. 
Such superposition is further the very condition for the indexical “I” to be meaningful, 
though this issue runs beyond the range of this essay26. It is essential to the meaning of “I” 
that it refers to exactly a person whom the word “you” in your mouth refers to. Each of us 
can be a human being only by virtue of mutually being inter-human. What makes inter-
human-being possible is exactly that each of us thinks and talks about oneself under the 
schema “I = you of you, and vice versa”, where each has already mastered how to identify 
the referent of both ‘I’ and ‘You’ in terms of proper names.
To be sure, we might sometimes be seduced to take these facts for a merely contingent 
matter of biological and sociological facts, and to suppose that the indexical ‘I’ could be 
meaningful in a solipsist’s mouth, totally apart from the above schema. To cite Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s phrases, the supposed solipsist might assert that “[o]nly what I see … is really 
seen”, and explain his use of the ‘I’ by claiming that “the word ‘I’ I don’t mean L.W.”, but 
that “it will do if the others understand ‘I’ to mean L.W., if just now I am in fact L.W.” (64.) 
What is essential is, however, that “it is conceivable that my fellow creatures thereupon will 
arrange their notation so as to fall in with me by saying “so-and-so is really seen” instead 
of “L.W. sees so-and-so”, etc., etc.” (66, emphasis added.) This is precisely because his 
audiences can correctly understand that he tries merely to “adopt a symbolism in which a 
certain person … holds an exceptional place”. They understand this precisely by virtue of 
taking his utterance of ‘I’ under the above schema, even if the solipsist insisted that “the other 
should not be able to understand ‘what I really mean’” (65.) 
To continue to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, there may be no objection to adopting such 
a symbolism in itself. “What, however, is wrong, is to think that I can justify this choice of 
notation” (66), by virtue of positing, as a referent of “I” in an avowal, an ‘inner self’ who just 
happens to be identified as a person L.W. now. This diagnosis by Wittgenstein of solipsism 
seems also to support the Kantian warning against hypostatizing the cogito as a subsistent 
inner monarch who could govern his inner territory at will, though the ontological questions 
about the ‘self’ is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Concluding Remark
The mutual acknowledgement through mutual superposition is essential to the very 
26 About my view on this issue, see Ohba 200.
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notion of responsibility. To be responsible  involves to be prepared to respond  to a question 
and a calling issued from others, even when it jars on my ears. The alleged ‘inner self’ could, 
however, gerrymander a  range of my preparedness  to  respond by  treating an unpleasant 
question or calling as a mere noise rather than a voice, just as it could refuse to identify an 
embarrassing thought as my own by treating it as a mere happening within me.
I am not claiming  that any sort of hypostatization of  the ‘I think’ would necessarily 
lead to the degeneration. It would be hard, however, to deny that there can be some affinity 
between them. An old far-western legend tells an interesting episode about gerrymandering 
a  range of  responsibility: an autonomous and well-behaved person “wanted  to vindicate 
himself, and he asked ‘Who is my neighbor?’” To this extent at least, the Kantian criticism 
of hypostatization of the ‘I think’ is relevant, even if my interpretation of Kant is exaggerated 
and not yet conclusive*.
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